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ABSTRACT
JOHN INAZU: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly
(Under the direction of Jeff Spinner-Halev)
This thesis examines “the right of the people peaceably to assemble” and its
gradual disappearance from American constitutional jurisprudence. I begin by exploring
the English and colonial roots of the freedom of assembly and its adoption in the Bill of
Rights. In doing so, I highlight the significance of political and religious assembly to the
Framers and in the early Republic. I then examine the development of assembly in
American constitutional law and the later emergence of the right of association in the
context of mid-twentieth century liberalism. I argue throughout the thesis that assembly,
unlike association, reminds us of the importance of protecting the physical act of people
coming together, the value of allowing dissent, and the fundamental differences between
state and non-state social practices. I conclude by positing how a recovery of the
freedom of assembly might be employed within a contemporary legal framework to
strengthen the constitutional protections for groups.
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Introduction
Anita Whitney is a name familiar to American lawyers. The daughter of a
California state senator and niece of a Supreme Court justice, Whitney graduated from
Wellesley College in 1889 and immersed herself in local civic activities. She eventually
joined the Socialist Party and served as a delegate to the 1919 organizing convention of
the Communist Labor Party of California. Her involvement in the latter led to her arrest,
prosecution, and conviction under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act.1 In 1927, a
majority of the Supreme Court upheld her conviction over her objection that the
California law violated her rights under the First Amendment.2 The Court expressed
particular concern that Whitney’s actions were undertaken in concert with others, which
“involve[d] even greater threat to the public peace and security than the isolated
utterances and acts of individuals.”3
Chaffing at this rationale, Justice Louis Brandeis penned one of the most famous
concurrences in American jurisprudence. Brandeis wrote:
1Vincent Blasi has written a fascinating account of these circumstances. See Vincent
Blasi, "The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in
Whitney v. California," William and Mary Law Review 29 (1988).
2Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). The decision was formally overruled
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam).
3Whitney v. California, 511.
2Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.4
Legal scholars have written volumes about these words and those that followed, and
Brandeis’s concurrence has been praised for its eloquent defense of free speech. Vincent
Blasi has called the opinion “arguably the most important essay ever written, on or off the
bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.”5 And Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court in the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan, deemed Brandeis’s Whitney
concurrence the “classic formulation” of the fundamental principle underlying free
speech.6 But a monolithic focus on speech obscures the textured nature of Brandeis’s
argument. He specified that California’s statute reached beyond mere words.7 And
eleven times throughout his relatively brief opinion, Brandeis invoked the union of the
freedoms of speech and assembly.
4Ibid., 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
5Blasi, "The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in
Whitney v. California," 668. Blasi’s article focused on free speech.
6New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, A
Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History and Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 194.
7
“The novelty in the prohibition introduced is that the statute aims, not at the practice of
criminal syndicalism, nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at association with those
who propose to preach it.” 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3Brandeis’s invocation of assembly pointed to something beyond the freedom of
speech,8 to that right that Abraham Lincoln once describe as part of “the Constitutional
substitute for revolution.”9 Ten years after Whitney, the Court declared that “[t]he right of
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.”10 And even as late as 1973, John Rawls’s path breaking work, A Theory of
Justice, characterized assembly as one of the “basic liberties.”11 But the “right of the
people peaceably to assemble” 12 is now little more than an historical footnote in
American jurisprudence. Why has assembly so utterly disappeared from our
constitutional landscape?
8The phrase “speech and assembly” appears in only one Supreme Court opinion prior to
Whitney. See New York Ex Rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U.S. 590, 591 (1923) (noting that
petitioners alleged a deprivation of the “rights of freedom of speech and assembly”).
Subsequent to Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney, “speech and assembly” is found in
over one hundred of the Court’s opinions.
9Abraham Lincoln, Uncollected Letters of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Gilbert A. Tracy (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), 127. In a January 19, 1860, letter to
Alexander H. Stephens, Lincoln wrote that: “the right of peaceable assembly and of
petition and by article Fifth of the Constitution, the right of amendment, is the
Constitutional substitute for revolution. Here is our Magna Carta not wrested by Barons
from King John, but the free gift of states to the nation they create . . .” Ibid.
10De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). Cf. Glenn Abernathy, The Right of
Assembly and Association (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1961), 4. (“a
broad right of peaceable assembly is a vital element in the maintenance of the democratic
process”).
11John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 53. Rawls relies
on association rather than assembly in his later work. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 221 n.8.
12U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4This thesis suggests that the right of assembly was largely supplanted by the
judicially constructed right of association that emerged in the era of mid-twentieth
century liberalism. But the move away from assembly was not merely a shift in
terminology; rather, the modern neglect of assembly has obscured important historical
and conceptual factors that informed its initial inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Whitney
reminds us of three of these factors: the importance of protecting the physical act of
people coming together, the value of allowing dissent—both spoken and lived—to
democratic practice, and the fundamental differences between state and non-state social
practices. My contention is that association (at least insofar as it has been doctrinally
shaped in American jurisprudence) cannot properly account for these values inherent in
the concept of assembly. This has opened the door for the hegemonic tendencies of the
modern liberal state to demand “that the internal life and organization of associations
mirror liberal democratic principles and practices.”13
My objective is to recover the freedom of assembly in an attempt to deepen the
protections for group autonomy that now rest solely and precariously on the freedom of
association (and, to some extent, on the freedom of speech and the freedom of religion14).
13Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in
America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 36
14 Assembly may provide a partial solution to the Court’s troubled religious liberty
jurisprudence. The religion jurisprudence of the past fifty years has increasingly
conceived of religion as an individual or personal liberty. But most religions—and
particularly the Western religions that occupy the majority of American religion
jurisprudence—are corporate practices. This understanding of religion in America may
lend itself to the notion of assembly. And historically, the freedom of assembly for
religious purposes preceded the freedom of assembly for political purposes. There are
thus both sociological and historical reasons for including assembly in a consideration of
religious freedom.
5While today’s cultural and legal climate raises the most serious challenges to practices at
odds with liberal democratic values, the eclectic collection of groups that have at one
time or another been silenced and stilled in the absence of meaningful constitutional
protections cuts across political and ideological camps. African-Americans and racial
bigots, conservative Christians and gay activists, all-male groups and women’s rightists,
Socialists and Jehovah’s Witnesses all have a stake in limiting the influence of state and
society on their ways of life. The freedom of assembly does not eliminate the challenges
confronted by these corporate practices—the Supreme Court, after all, upheld Anita
Whitney’s conviction over her arguments of free assembly—but it offers historical,
jurisprudential, and theoretical arguments unavailable to those who seek refuge
exclusively in association.
I begin this thesis by exploring the English and colonial roots of the freedom of
assembly and its adoption in the Bill of Rights. In doing so, I highlight the significance
of political and religious assembly to the Framers and in the early Republic. Part II
examines the development of assembly in American constitutional law. Parts III and IV
trace the emergence of the right of association in the context of mid-twentieth century
liberalism. I also draw attention to the Court’s weakening of the protections afforded to
groups through its hierarchical distinction between intimate and expressive association in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.15 I conclude the thesis in Part V by positing how a
recovery of the freedom of assembly might be employed within a contemporary legal
framework to strengthen the constitutional protections for groups.
15Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
I. The Right Peaceably to Assemble
English Roots
The recognition of assembly as a political right began in England as a derivative
of the right of petition and first appeared in English law with the signing of the Magna
Charta in 1215. Chapter 61 of the Great Charter addressed breaches of the “articles of
peace and security” and provided that four barons “shall repair to us . . . and laying open
the grievance, shall petition to have it redressed without delay.”16 The term “assembly”
didn’t enter the English legal vernacular for more than two centuries, and even then it
was only defined negatively. In 1412, the statute of 13 Henry IV mandated enforcement
of civil order “[i]f any riot, assembly, or rout of the people, against the law be made.”17
In 1549, Parliament passed a more pernicious act, declaring it “to be treason for any
twelve persons to meet together on any matter of the state.”18 The breadth of this law,
16Quoted in George P. Smith, "The Development of the Right of Assembly: A Current
Socio-Legal Investigation," William and Mary Law Review 9 (1967): 361 n.11. In one of
the most oft-cited articles on the American right of assembly, James Jarrett and Vernon
Mund contend that the act of protest that preceded the signing of the Magna Charta in
which the barons “assembled in arms and presented their demands of the King at the
Temple” was itself an act of assembly. James M. Jarrett and Vernon A. Mund, "The
Right of Assembly," New York University Law Quarterly Review 9 (1931): 5. But while
the barons’ protest may be similar to some forms of the classical Greco-Roman
understanding of political assembly, it is misleading to imply a resemblance to
contemporary notions of assembly that do not rely on armed insurrection.
1713 Hen. IV, c. 7 sec. 1 (1412), quoted in Mund, "The Right of Assembly," 7.
18Ibid. The act was followed by the statutes of I Mary c. 12 (1553) and I Eliz. c. 16
(1558), which likely provided “the first comprehensive regulation of unlawful
7issued in response to “the tumults and insurrections of the common people throughout the
various counties,”19 struck at the core of political assembly that existed apart from the
state. Subsequent restrictions in 155320 and 155821 were less draconian but appeared
equally inhospitable to political dissent: justices of the peace were authorized to disperse
a gathering if in their opinion it was or could lead to an unlawful assembly.22
The Tumultuous Petition Act of 1661 reestablished a limited freedom of assembly
for ten or fewer people “to present any publique or private grievance or complaint to any
member or members of Parliament . . . or to the King’s Majesty.”23 Twenty-eight years
later, the English Bill of Rights declared “[t]hat it is the right of the subjects to petition
the King and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”24 But
despite the guarantee of petition, the freedom of assembly remained weakly contingent:
in 1715, an “Act for preventing Tumults and riotous Assemblies” made it a felony if
assemblies.” Smith, "The Development of the Right of Assembly: A Current Socio-Legal
Investigation," 363 n.19.
19Mund, "The Right of Assembly," 7.
20I Mary c. 12.
21I Eliz. c. 16.
22 Smith, "The Development of the Right of Assembly: A Current Socio-Legal
Investigation," 363 n.19. Mund, "The Right of Assembly," 8. William Lambard offered
the first comprehensive explanation of unlawful assembly in 1619: “An unlawful
assembly, is of the companie of three or more persons, disorderly coming together,
forcibly to commit an unlawful act, as to beat a man or to enter upon his possession or the
like.” William Lambard, Eirenarcha (1619): 175-76, quoted in Mund, "The Right of
Assembly," 5.
2313 Chas. 2, st. 1, c. 5 (1661).
241 Will. & Mar. sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
8twelve or more people unlawfully assembled failed to disperse within an hour after
authorities read a proclamation.25 The English right of assembly, then, created only a
precariously limited forum for expressing political grievances.
Assembly in Colonial America
The gradual recognition of a limited right of assembly in England also had its
influence in the American colonies. Gordon Wood has noted that eighteenth-century
Americans were familiar with the ancient English term “convention,” which was “a
meeting, an act of coming together, used to refer to all sorts of assemblies, especially
formal assemblies, convened for deliberation on important matters, whether
ecclesiastical, political or social.” 26 Although the colonists “generally regarded
conventions as legally deficient bodies existing outside of the regularly constituted
authority,” they were “closely allied in English thought with the people’s right to
assemble and to present grievances to the government.”27 And the nascent colonial
freedoms went beyond their English roots. As David Fellman has observed, the deep
roots of “the rights of peaceful assembly and petition . . . in the American experience
25 Smith, "The Development of the Right of Assembly: A Current Socio-Legal
Investigation," 363 n.22. This is the origin of the phrase “reading the Riot Act.” Ibid.
26Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 310. Wood explains that “[t]he American
colonists were familiar with the term convention and used it to denote all sorts of
meetings for quasi-public purposes, whether of New England Congregational ministers in
the early eighteenth century or of delegates discussing plans for continental union in
1754.” Ibid., 312.
27Ibid.
9[were] reflected in the frequency with which they were asserted in the formative period of
American history.”28
In 1774, the First Continental Congress resolved that “the inhabitants of the
English colonies in North America . . . have a right peaceably to assemble, consider their
grievances, and petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations,
and commitments for the same, are illegal.”29 Two years later, North Carolina and
Pennsylvania decreed “[t]hat the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for
their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for
redress of grievances.”30 When the State Conventions met in 1788, North Carolina and
Virginia advanced identical amendments based largely on the 1776 North Carolina and
Pennsylvania declarations:
That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for
the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every
freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for redress of
grievances.31
The state proposals inserted the disjunctive “or” before “to instruct their representatives.”
This eliminated (perhaps inadvertently) an ambiguity in the earlier declarations as to the
28 David Fellman, The Constitutional Right of Association (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963), 5.
29Neil H. Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 143. This appears to be the first use of the
phrase “peaceably to assemble.”
30Ibid., 141. Vermont followed with similar language the following year. Ibid., 142.
Delaware and Maryland established a right to petition the legislature for redress of
grievances but made no mention of assembly. Ibid., 140.
31Ibid., 140.
10
purpose of assembly. Without the disjunctive, the right of assembly could have been
interpreted as existing only for the purposes of instructing representatives or applying to
the legislature for redress of grievances.32 But the addition of “or” in the two proposals
clarified textually that assembly was not limited to these purposes.
Another slight language change worked in the opposite direction. The earlier
declarations had placed the possessive pronoun “their” before the words “common
good;” the proposals changed this to the definite article “the.”33 Whether intended or
accidental, this alteration was not insignificant: the difference between the common good
as it is understood by the people who assemble before the state and the common good as
it is articulated by the state may be the difference between permitting or prohibiting
dissenting views. The point was not lost during the later House debates over the
language of assembly in the Bill of Rights. When Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania
contended that, with respect to assembly, “every thing that was not incompatible with the
general good ought to be granted,”34 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts replied that if
Hartley “supposed that the people had a right to consult for the common good” but
“could not consult unless they met for that purpose,” he was in fact “contend[ing] for
nothing.”35 In other words, if the right of assembly encompassed only a majoritarian
32This appears to be the approach taken by Delaware and Maryland.
33The word “their” is retained in the New York and Rhode Island proposals. Ibid.
34Congressional Register, August 15, 1789, vol. 2, quoted in Cogan, The Complete Bill of
Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins, 145.
35Ibid.
11
understanding of the common good, then its use as a means of protest or dissent would be
eviscerated.36
Assembly in the Bill of Rights
The First Congress convened in 1789 to draft amendments based upon the various
state proposals. On June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed the following clause
pertaining to assembly:
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and
consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by
petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.37
A subsequent draft combined assembly with several other rights under
consideration:
The freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to
the government for redress of grievances shall not be infringed.38
The House approved this language on August 24, 1789, and the Senate took it under
consideration the following day.39 Ten days later, the Senate defeated a motion to strike
36Cf. Melvin Rishe, "Freedom of Assembly," DePaul Law Review 15 (1965): 337 (“Were
the courts truly bound to delve into whether or not an assembly served the common good,
it is likely that many assemblies that have been held to be protected by the constitution
would lose this protection.”).
37Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins, 129.
Madison’s language reverted to the possessive pronoun “their” before “common good.”
It also retained a clear distinction between the right to assembly and the right to petition
for grievances.
38Ibid., 143. This version also changed the semi-colon after “common good” to a comma.
39Ibid., 131.
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the reference to the common good.40 But the following week, the text inexplicably
dropped out when the Senate merged language pertaining to religion into the
Amendment:
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and petition to the government for the redress of grievances.41
The removal of the language pertaining to the common good may have been intended to
broaden the scope of the assembly clause, but it also reintroduced a textual ambiguity.
With neither the disjunctive “or” of the earlier state declarations nor the prepositional
“for their common good” following the reference to assembly, the text now described
“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.” This left unclear whether the amendment recognized a single
right to assemble for the purpose of petitioning the government or whether it established
both an unencumbered right of assembly and a separate right of petition. In one of the
only recent considerations of assembly in the First Amendment, Jason Mazzone argues in
favor of the former.42 Mazzone suggests that:
40 Senate Journal. 1st Cong., 3 September 1789, 70. The following day the Senate
adopted similar language: “That Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the [r]ight of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for
their common good, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Ibid., 4
September 1789, 71.
41Ibid., 9 September 1789, 77. The amendment took its final form on September 24,
1789: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.” Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and
Origins, 136.
42Jason Mazzone, "Freedom's Associations," Washington Law Review 77 (2002). But see
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale
13
There are two clues that we should understand assembly and petition to
belong together. The first clue is the use of “and to petition,” which
contrasts with the use of “or” in the remainder of the First Amendment’s
language. The second clue is the use of “right,” in the singular (as in “the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition”), rather than the
plural “rights” (as in “the rights of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition”). The prohibitions on Congress’ power can therefore be
understood as prohibitions with respect to speech, press, and assembly in
order to petition the government.43
Mazzone’s interpretation is textually and contextually tenuous. The textual difficulty
stems from the comma preceding the phrase “and to petition.” The comma is clearly
residual of the earlier text which had described the “right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.”44 Whether left in deliberately or inadvertently,45 it relates back to a
distinction between a right to peaceable assembly and a right to petition.46
University Press, 1998), 26 (referring to assembly and petition as separate clauses);
William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (Westbury,
NY: Foundation Press, 1995), 32 (referring to a distinct “‘peaceably to assemble’
clause”).
43Mazzone, "Freedom's Associations," 712-13.
44Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins, 143.
The earlier version derived in turn from Madison’s draft. Ibid., 129. Mazzone
recognizes that “in Madison’s draft, assembly is separated from petitioning by a semi-
colon, perhaps indicating that while the right of assembly is related to the right of
petition, assembly is not necessarily limited to formulating petitions.” Mazzone,
"Freedom's Associations," 715 n.409.
45 Caleb Nelson cautions against placing too much reliance on punctuation in the
Constitution because at the time of the Founding “punctuation marks [were] thought to
lack the legal status of words.” Caleb Nelson, "Preemption," Virginia Law Review 86
(2000): 258. He notes that “[t]he ratification of the Constitution by the states reflects this
relatively casual attitude toward punctuation” because many states that incorporated a
copy of the Constitution in the official form of ratification varied its punctuation.” Ibid.,
259, n.102. Nelson cites as an example the copy of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania
form of ratification, which used “different punctuation marks than the Constitution
engrossed at the Federal Convention” in roughly thirty-five places. Ibid. My reliance on
14
As an historical matter, the First Congress appeared to have conceived of a
broader notion of assembly, as evidenced in an exchange between Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts and John Page of Virginia during the House debates over the language of
the Bill of Rights. Sedgwick criticized the proposed right of assembly as redundant in
light of the freedom of speech:
If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it
is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly
a thing that never would be called in question; it is derogatory to the
dignity of the House to descend to such minutiae.47
Page responded that Sedgwick:
. . . supposes [the right of assembly] no more essential than whether a man
has a right to wear his hat or not, but let me observe to him that such rights
have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to pull of his hat when he
appeared before the face of authority; people have also been prevented
from assembling together on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to
guard against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the
declaration of rights; if the people could be deprived of the power of
assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every
other privilege contained in the clause.48
this particular comma is more forensic than substantive: it offers circumstantial evidence
that the drafters envisioned a broader right of assembly.
46Mazzone addresses the comma in a footnote and argues that because it “mirrors the
comma” preceding the words “or prohibit the free exercise thereof” in the first half of the
First Amendment, “[i]t does not therefore signal a right of petition separate from the right
of assembly.” Mazzone, "Freedom's Associations," 713 n.392. The argument for textual
parallelism doesn’t hold because the free exercise clause explicitly refers back to
“religion” (before the comma) with the word “thereof.” A closer parallel—which
illustrates Mazzone’s interpretive problem—is the suggestion that the comma separating
speech and press connotes that they embody only a singular freedom.
47Cogan, The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins, 144.
48Congressional Register, August 15, 1789, vol. 2, quoted in Ibid. Following Page’s
comments, Sedgwick’s motion to strike assembly from the draft amendment was defeated
by a “considerable majority.” Ibid., 145.
15
Irving Brant notes that while Page’s allusion to a man without a hat is lost on a
contemporary audience, “[t]he mere reference to it was equivalent to half an hour of
oratory” before the First Congress.49 Page was referring to the trial of William Penn.50
William Penn’s story of assembly began in 1664, when Parliament passed the
Conventicle Act forbidding “any Nonconformists attending a religious meeting, or
assembling themselves together to the number of more than five persons in addition to
members of the family, for any religious purpose not according to the rules of the Church
of England.”51 On August 14, 1670, Penn and other Quakers attempted to gather for
worship at their meeting-house on Gracechurch Street, London. 52 Prevented from
entering by a company of soldiers, Penn began delivering a sermon to the Quakers
assembled in the street.53 Penn and a fellow Quaker, William Mead, were arrested and
brought to trial in a dramatic sequence of events that included a contempt of court charge
stemming from their wearing of hats in the courtroom.54 A jury acquitted the two men on
49Irving Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1965), 55.
50Ibid., 61.
5116 Charles II c. 4 (1664). The act was renewed in 1667 and again in 1670. William
Dixon, William Penn: An Historical Biography (Philadelphia: Blanchard and Lea, 1851),
75, 76.
52Ibid., 76.
53Ibid..
54Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning, 57 (quoting Penn). Penn and Mead
were fined for contempt of court for wearing their hats after being ordered by an officer
of the court to put them on. Ibid.
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the charge that their public worship constituted an unlawful assembly. The jurors were
then themselves imprisoned for their verdict and later vindicated in habeas corpus
proceedings.
The case became famous throughout Old and New England for its
pronouncements on religious freedom, trial by jury, and the right of assembly: “Every
Quaker in America knew of the ordeal suffered by the founder of Pennsylvania and its
bearing on freedom of religion, of speech, and the right of assembly. Every American
lawyer with a practice in the appellate courts was familiar with it, either directly or
through its connection with its still more famous aftermath.”55 According to Brant:
William Penn loomed large in American history, but even if he had never
crossed the Atlantic, bringing the Quaker religion with him, Americans
would have known about his ‘tumultuous assembly’ and his hat. Few
pamphlets of the seventeenth century had more avid readers than the one
entitled ‘The People’s Ancient and Just Liberties, asserted, in the Trial of
William Penn and William Mead at the Old Bailey, 22 Charles II 1670,
written by themselves.’ Congressman Page had known the story from
boyhood, reproduced in Emlyn’s State Trials to which his father
subscribed in 1730. It was available, both in the State Trials and as a
pamphlet, to the numerous congressmen who had used the facilities of the
City Library of Philadelphia. Madison had an account of it written by Sir
John Hawles, a libertarian lawyer who became Solicitor General after the
overthrow of the Stuarts in 1688.56
The act of protest that sparked Penn’s well-known ordeal had nothing to do with
petitioning for a redress of grievances. It was an act of religious worship. When
Congressman Page alluded to this act in the House debate over assembly, it was clear
55Ibid., 61.
56Ibid., 56.
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both to him and to his audience that the right of assembly under discussion encompassed
more than petition for redress of grievances.
The members of the House also knew the dangers of an unconstrained right of
assembly. Madison reported that immediately prior to Page’s allusion to Penn, Elbridge
Gerry had described assembly as an “essential right.”57 Gerry contended that the right of
assembly “had been abused in the year 1786 in Massachusetts,”58 a reference to Shays’s
Rebellion. The rebellion had been an abuse of assembly precisely because it had relied
on armed insurrection rather than peaceful protest. But in the wake of the unrest, “many
common people felt that a new struggle was needed to preserve the cause of freedom for
which they had fought during the revolutionary war.”59 Seven years later, this sentiment
spawned the first test of the newly minted right of assembly: the Democratic-Republican
societies.60
Early American Assemblies
The popular societies known as Democratic-Republican societies consisted
largely of farmers and laborers wary of the aristocratic leanings of Hamilton and other
57Congressional Register, August 15, 1789, vol. 2, quoted in Cogan, The Complete Bill of
Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins, 144.
58Ibid.
59Philip Sheldon Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800: A
Documentary Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations, Addresses, Resolutions, and
Toasts (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 5.
60Ibid.
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Federalists.61 Between 1793 and 1800, almost fifty societies emerged from Maine to
Georgia; the largest of these was the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, which boasted
over 300 members.62 According to Philip Foner:
A great part of the activities of the popular societies consisted of creating
public discussions; composing, adopting, and issuing circulars, memorials,
resolutions, and addresses to the people; and remonstrances to the
President and the Congress—all expressing the feelings of the assembled
groups on current political issues.63
The societies “invariably claimed the right of citizens to assemble.”64 A 1794 resolution
from a society in Washington, North Carolina asserted that: “It is the unalienable right of
a free and independent people to assemble together in a peaceable manner to discuss with
firmness and freedom all subjects of public concern.”65 That same year, the Boston
Independent Chronicle declared that:
Under a Constitution which expressly provides ‘That the people have a
right in an orderly and peaceable manner to assemble and consult upon
the common good,’ there can be no necessity for an apology to the public
for an Association of a number of citizens to promote and cherish the
social virtues, the love of their country, and a respect for its Laws and
Constitutions.66
The societies were ultimately short-lived, due in part to their unsuccessful opposition to
Jay’s Treaty and President Washington’s belief that they were linked to the Whiskey
61Ibid.
62Ibid., 7.
63Ibid., 10.
64Ibid., 11.
65Ibid., 11 (quoting North-Carolina Gazette (New Bern), April 19, 1974).
66Ibid., 25 (quoting Independent Chronicle (Boston), January 16, 1794).
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Rebellion of 1794.67 But even though they had largely dissipated by the turn of the
century, their influence was not inconsequential. According to Foner, “[a]s a center of
Republican agitation and propaganda . . . the societies did much to forge the sword that
defeated Federalism and put Jefferson in the presidency.”68
The Democratic-Republican societies may have provided the first test of assembly
in the new republic, but the constitutional freedom took its shape over the next century in
the context two longer-lasting movements: abolitionism and women’s suffrage.
Although an extended consideration of the importance of assembly to these movements is
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is significant that both women and African-Americans
repeatedly asserted and were denied the right of assembly. C. Peter Ripley notes that by
1835, “most southern states had outlawed the right of assembly and organization by free
blacks, prohibited them from holding church services without a white clergyman present,
required their adherence to slave curfews, and minimized their contact with slaves.”69 In
1836, Theodore Dwight Weld drew attention to “‘the right of peaceably assembling’
violently wrested.”70
67Ibid., 27-38.
68Ibid., 40.
69 C. Peter Ripley, The Black Abolitionist Papers (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1985), 443 n.9. See also Harry Kalven, The Negro and the First
Amendment (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965). Akhil Amar writes that the
right of assembly for religious worship was “a core right that southern states had
violated.” Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, 245.
70 Theodore Dwight Weld, “The Power of Congress over Slavery in the District of
Columbia,” reprinted in Jacobus Ten Broek, Equal under Law (New York: Collier
Books, 1965), 271. Jacobus tenBroek has described Weld’s tract as “a restatement and
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Because the abolitionists were themselves denied the rights of speech and
assembly, and because many of these abolitionists were women, “freedom of assembly
and freedom of speech were indelibly linked with the woman’s rights movement from its
genesis in the abolition movement.”71 Abolitionist Angelina Grimké “sowed the seeds
for nineteenth-century feminism” by insisting on a “right to act.”72 Suffragists like
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony organized their efforts around conventions
“predicated upon the right to assemble peaceably.”73 One scholar has suggested that
“virtually the entire suffrage story can be told through the prism of the right of
assembly.”74
Both the abolitionist and women’s suffrage movements claimed the freedom of
assembly in support of their enduring efforts toward equality and reform. As Akhil Amar
has argued, these movements of the disenfranchised brought “a different lived
experience” to the words of the First Amendment’s assembly clause. 75 They were
political movements, to be sure, but they embodied and symbolized even larger societal
synthesis of abolitionist constitutional theory as of that time.” Ten Broek, Equal under
Law, 243.
71Linda J. Lumsden, Rampant Women: Suffragists and the Right of Assembly (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1997), xxiii.
72Ibid., xxiv.
73Ibid., xxv.
74Ibid., 144.
75Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, 246.
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and cultural challenges to the existing order than had the earlier Democratic-Republican
societies. The freedom of assembly demanded by abolitionists and suffragists may have
been instrumentally valuable for voicing their dissent, but it also protected the alternate
modes of life represented in their acts of corporate gathering. The physical coming
together of disfavored groups that encapsulated a politics different than the ruling
hegemonic order was in some ways as “political” as the grievances that they raised.
II. Assembly in American Constitutional Law
Despite the early American experiments in assembly in the eighteenth century
political societies, the abolitionist movement, and the women’s suffrage movement, it
took nearly a century for the first case on the freedom of assembly to reach the Supreme
Court.76
The Early Cases: Cruikshank and Presser
On Easter Sunday of 1873, white residents of Colfax, Louisiana and nearby
parishes revolted against local black officeholders recently appointed by the governor.
The ensuing riot and massacre left dozens of black citizens dead. 77 The federal
government tried nearly one hundred white perpetrators for violations of the Enforcement
Act of 1870,78 which among other things, prohibited conspiracy “to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and
enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws
of the United States.”79 Two counts of the indictments alleged that the defendants had
76 The reason for the delay owes largely to the relatively late recognition of the
incorporation doctrine. See infra, note 91.
77Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 120-21.
7816 Stat. 141.
79United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1876).
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prevented black citizens from enjoying their “lawful right and privilege to peaceably
assemble together with each other and with other citizens of the United States for a
peaceful and lawful purpose.”80 The jury convicted only three defendants, William
Cruikshank and two others. On appeal, Cruikshank and his co-defendants contended that
the First Amendment did not guarantee the right of assembly against infringement by
private citizens.81 In United States v. Cruikshank,82 the Court agreed, concluding that the
First Amendment:
. . . assumes the existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful
purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress. The right was
not created by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed,
except as against congressional interference. For their protection in its
enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States. The power for
that purpose was originally placed there, and it has never been surrendered
to the United States.83
Cruikshank is a straightforward legal decision: the Court simply concluded that private
citizens could not be prosecuted for denying the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly
to other citizens.84 But Cruikshank’s dictum was more memorable than its holding.
Reiterating that the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly established a narrow right
enforceable only against the federal government, Chief Justice Waite wrote that:
80Ibid., 551.
81Although subsequent cases addressed whether the state could criminalize an assembly
of citizens, the issue before the Court in Cruikshank was whether the state could
criminalize the infringement of an assembly of one group of citizens by another.
8292 U.S. 542 (1876).
83United States v. Cruikshank, 552 (emphasis added).
84The holding is consistent with a contemporary understanding of most of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights.
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The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an
attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and
guaranteed by, the United States.85
In context, it is evident that Waite was merely listing petition as an example of the kind of
assembly protected against infringement by the federal government; the Constitution also
guaranteed assembly “for any thing else connected with the powers of the duties of the
national government.”86 But Waite’s reference to “[t]he right of the people peaceably to
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances” closely
resembled the text of the First Amendment. Read in isolation from the qualifying
language in the rest of Waite’s paragraph and absent any recognition of the history and
debates informing the constitutional text, Waite’s dictum could be erroneously construed
as limiting assembly to the purpose of petition.
Ten years after Cruikshank, Justice Woods made this interpretive mistake in
Presser v. Illinois.87 Woods concluded that Cruikshank had announced that the First
Amendment only protected the right peaceably to assemble if “the purpose of the
assembly was to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”88 This misreading
85United States v. Cruikshank, 552.
86Moreover, it is clear that Waite was not engaging in a careful exegesis of the assembly
clause: a few paragraphs earlier, he misquoted the constitutional text by omitting the
word “peaceably” and the residual comma between the phrases “to assemble” and “and to
petition.” Waite had written that: “The first amendment to the Constitution prohibits
Congress from abridging ‘the right of the people to assemble and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.’” Ibid.
87Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
88Ibid., 267.
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of Cruikshank is the only time that the Supreme Court has expressly limited the right of
assembly to the purpose of petition. 89 But the constrained notion of assembly has
persisted in recent scholarship.90
Incorporation: Assembly Made Applicable to the States
There is another reason that neither Presser nor Cruikshank accurately conveys a
contemporary understanding of the scope of the First Amendment’s freedom of
assembly: both cases preceded the Court’s incorporation of assembly through the
89The Court has contradicted this view in later cases. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945) (referring to “the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances” (emphasis added)); Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 409 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The First Amendment “has not generally been
thought to protect the right peaceably to assemble only when the purpose of the assembly
is to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
90See Charles E. Rice, Freedom of Association (New York: New York University Press,
1962), 109 (citing Cruikshank for the view that the language in the First Amendment
“constituted the right of petition as the primary right, and the right of assembly as the
ancillary right, thereby guaranteeing a right to assemble in order to petition”); Abernathy,
The Right of Assembly and Association, 152 (“It is important to note that the Cruikshank
dictum narrowed the federal right from that of ‘the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition for a redress of grievances’ to ‘the right of the people peaceably to
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for
anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National Government.”)
(emphasis added); Edward Samuel Corwin, Harold William Chase, and Craig R. Ducat,
Edwin S. Corwin's the Constitution and What It Means Today, 14th ed. (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1978), 332 (citing Cruikshank for the view that historically
“the right of petition is the primary right, the right peaceably to assemble a subordinate
and instrumental right, as if Amendment I read: ‘the right of the people peaceably to
assemble’ in order to ‘petition the government’”). Presser has also been cited for the
position that the freedom of assembly is limited to the purpose of petition. See Frank
Easterbrook, "Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association," Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy 10 (1987): 91 (citing Presser for the view that the freedom of assembly is
“the exercise by groups of the right to petition for redress of grievances”).
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Fourteenth Amendment,91 which came in the 1937 case of De Jonge v. Oregon.92 Like
Whitney, which had been decided ten years earlier, De Jonge involved an appeal from a
conviction for criminal syndicalism. Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that:
The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees
that right [of assembly] against abridgment by Congress. But explicit
mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one
that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political
institutions,—principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in
the general terms of its due process clause.93
Hughes underscored the significance of incorporation by observing that “[t]he right of
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.” 94 In words strikingly similar to Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence, he
emphasized the need:
. . . to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press
and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of
constitutional government.95
91 For most of our nation’s history, the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
considered enforceable only against the federal government, not against state and local
government. As Cruikshank demonstrates, the Court construed quite literally the First
Amendment’s prohibition that “Congress shall make no law . . .” The Court began to
apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states following the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.”
92De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
93Ibid., 364.
94Ibid. Brandeis had declared the right of assembly to be fundamental in his Whitney
concurrence ten years earlier. Whitney v. California, 373.
95De Jonge v. Oregon, 365.
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The period from 1937 to 1958 included a number of rhetorical tributes to
assembly in American jurisprudence. Shortly after De Jonge, the Court pronounced that
“[t]he power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception
rather than the rule”96 and that “freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful
purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship,
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 97 In 1943, the Court
emphasized in West Virginia v. Barnette98 that:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.99
Seven years later, Chief Justice Vinson wrote for the Court in American Communications
Association v. Douds100 that:
The high place in which the right to speak, think, and assemble as you will
was held by the Framers of the Bill of Rights and is held today by those
who value liberty both as a means and an end indicates the solicitude with
which we must view any assertion of personal freedoms. We must
recognize, moreover, that regulation of “conduct” has all too frequently
96Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937).
97Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939).
98West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
99Ibid., 638. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and petition are a “conjunction of liberties” that guard religious,
political, and secular clauses).
100American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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been employed by public authority as a cloak to hide censorship of
unpopular ideas.101
A Right Without a Doctrine
Despite its rhetorical tributes, the Court made surprisingly few advances toward a
coherent doctrinal approach to resolving cases brought under the freedom of assembly.
The Court seldom addressed assembly in isolation, and frequent invocations of
Brandeis’s phrase “speech and assembly” usually meant that challenges to the latter were
resolved within the doctrinal framework of the former. There was, in the end, no
concerted jurisprudential effort to develop a freestanding freedom of assembly.
Assembly, moreover, was never an absolute freedom. In the 1949 case of Cole v.
Arkansas,102 the Court observed that it was “no abridgment of free speech or assembly”
when “one is convicted of promoting, encouraging and aiding an assemblage the purpose
of which is to wreak violence.”103 That same year, the Court rejected a challenge to state
laws banning “closed shops” that restricted employment to union members. 104 In
101Ibid., 399. Cf. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106,
140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (legislative judgment “does not bear the same
weight and is not entitled to the same presumption of validity, when the legislation on its
face or in specific application restricts the rights of conscience, expression and assembly
protected by the Amendment.”) Rutledge continued that “[W]hile not absolute, the
enforced surrender of those rights must be justified by the existence and immediate
impendency of dangers to the public interest which clearly and not dubiously outweigh
those involved in the restrictions upon the very foundation of democratic institutions,
grounded as those institutions are in the freedoms of religion, conscience, expression and
assembly.” Ibid.
102Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949).
103Ibid., 353.
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language that foreshadowed future encroachments upon the rights of groups, the Court
observed that:
The constitutional right of workers to assemble, to discuss and formulate
plans for furthering their own self interest in jobs cannot be construed as a
constitutional guarantee that none shall get and hold jobs except those who
will join in the assembly or will agree to abide by the assembly’s plans.
For where conduct affects the interests of other individuals and the
general public, the legality of that conduct must be measured by whether
the conduct conforms to valid law, even though the conduct is engaged in
pursuant to plans of an assembly.105
These kinds of understandings about the limits of assembly reflected the simplistic “no
harm” approach of John Stuart Mill.106 The problem, of course, is that the assessment of
when conduct “affects the interests of other individuals and the general public” is usually
made by those who hold political power. The threat to public harm can almost always be
104Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949).
105Ibid., 531 (emphasis added).
106Mill famously applied his “no harm” principle to the context of speech and assembly
through his example of a corn dealer:
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the
contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in
which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a
positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers
are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur
punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the
form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable
cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases
absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and,
when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the
individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance
to other people.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Edward Alexander (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview
Press, 1999), 101.
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construed to prevent the very gathering itself, and absent a robust conception of
assembly, the right becomes exceedingly vulnerable to politicization.
The concern over a politically contingent right of assembly crystallized in 1953.
In Adler v. Board of Education,107 the Court addressed a speech and assembly challenge
to a New York law that denied employment in the public schools to any person who
advocated the violent overthrow of the government or who joined a society or group of
persons knowing that they advanced such advocacy. The law took aim at “members of
subversive groups, particularly of the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations”
who had been “infiltrating into public employment in the public schools of the State.”108
In passing the restrictive statute, the New York legislature had found that “the members
of such groups use their positions to advocate and teach their doctrines . . . without regard
to truth or free inquiry” in ways “sufficiently subtle to escape detection in the
classroom.”109 Six justices were sufficiently swept up in the spirit of the times to reject
the speech and assembly claim advanced by the petitioners, and the Court concluded that
New York had acted “in the exercise of its police power to protect the schools from
pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.” 110 Brandeis would have been
appalled.
107Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
108Ibid., 489.
109Ibid., 489-90.
110Ibid., 493.
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The Adventitious Roots of Association
Nine months after Adler, the Court addressed the constitutionality of loyalty oaths
for teachers in Wieman v. Updegraff.111 Wieman involved an Oklahoma statute that
required state employees to affirm, among other things, that they had not within the last
five years “been a member of . . . any agency, party, organization, association, or group
whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or
other authorized public agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive
organization.”112 The Court distinguished Adler by emphasizing that the New York law
required that an individual restricted from employment on the basis of association have
known the purposes of the society or group that he or she had joined. In contrast,
Oklahoma’s law mandated that “the fact of association alone determines disloyalty and
disqualification; it matters not whether association existed innocently or knowingly.”113
Concurring in the Court’s decision, Justice Frankfurter added that:
Since the affiliation which must thus be forsworn may well have been for
reasons or for purposes as innocent as membership in a club of one of the
established political parties, to require such an oath, on pain of a teacher’s
loss of his position in case of refusal to take the oath, penalizes a teacher
for exercising a right of association peculiarly characteristic of our people.
Such joining is an exercise of the rights of free speech and free inquiry.
By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech
and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling.114
111Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
112Ibid., 186.
113Ibid., 191. Wieman did not expressly mention the freedom of assembly because the
Court resolved the case on due process grounds rather than First Amendment grounds.
114Ibid., 195-95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Frankfurter’s concurrence is intriguing both for its absence of a reference to the freedom
of assembly and for its mention of “a right of association peculiarly characteristic of our
people.”115 Five years later, Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California116 referred to “the freedom of political expression or association”117 and
Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire118 noted “such
highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and
freedom of communication of ideas.”119
115Until 1948, the Court’s only reference to association had been a passing mention of
“the rights of free speech, assembly, and association” in Whitney. Whitney v. California,
371. Four years prior to Wieman, the Court had commented in Douds that “the effect of
[a] statute in proscribing beliefs—like its effect in restraining speech or freedom of
association—must be carefully weighed by the courts in determining whether the balance
struck by Congress comports with the dictates of the Constitution.” American
Communications Association v. Douds, 409. Frankfurter quoted the language from Douds
in his Adler dissent. Adler v. Board of Education, 505 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
116Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
117Ibid., 273.
118Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
119Ibid., 245. Warren elaborated that:
A fundamental principle of a democratic society is political freedom of the
individual. Our form of government is built on the premise that every
citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and
association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill
of Rights. . . . History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by
minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the
vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately
accepted. Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to
be condemned. The absence of such voices would be a symptom of grave
illness in our society.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 250-51.
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These changes crystallized the following year in NAACP v. Alabama.120 Two
years earlier, Alabama’s Attorney General had initiated an action to enjoin the NAACP
from operating within the state, and an Alabama state court had ordered the NAACP to
produce its membership lists during the course of the litigation surrounding the
injunction. The NAACP refused to produce the lists on constitutional grounds. Citing
De Jonge and Thomas—two cases involving the freedom of assembly—Justice Harlan
wrote that: “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembly.”121 De Jonge and Thomas had established that the freedom of assembly
was applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment,122 that it covered
political, economic, religious, and secular matters,123 and that it could only be restricted
“to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect.”124 Collectively, these precedents would have been sufficient for the Court to
120NAACP v. Alabama 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
121Ibid., 460.
122De Jonge v. Oregon, 364.
123Thomas v. Collins, 531 (“This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious
activity and institutions alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same
security as freedom of conscience. Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right
of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a
free press are not confined to any field of human interest. The idea is not sound therefore
that the First Amendment’s safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or economic
activity.” (citations omitted)).
124Ibid., 528 n.12 (“The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a ‘rational basis’ for adopting. But freedoms of speech and
34
have sided with the NAACP. But Harlan shifted his attention away from assembly,
writing that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.”125 As Thomas Emerson observed, Harlan:
. . . initially treated freedom of association as derivative from the first
amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and as ancillary to
them. In the remainder of his opinion, however, he elevated freedom of
association to an independent right, possessing an equal status with the
other rights specifically enumerated in the first amendment.126
With NAACP v. Alabama, then, the Court signaled a new right of association that
appeared broader than the right of assembly as it had been construed in the decisions of
the previous decade. But the Court’s weak and obfuscated link between assembly and
association left the latter concept without a constitutional or historical heritage.
Two years after NAACP v. Alabama, the Court examined another challenge to the
NAACP in Bates v. City of Little Rock. 127 With extreme brevity, Justice Stewart’s
majority opinion initially linked the right of association to the right of assembly but
quickly affirmed the freestanding nature of association:
of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the State may lawfully protect.” (citation omitted)).
125NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
126Thomas I. Emerson, "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression," Yale Law
Journal 74 (1964): 2.
127Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly
was considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation
of a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry—a
government dedicated to the establishment of justice and the preservation
of liberty. And it is now beyond dispute that freedom of association for
the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the
States.128
Ten months later, Stewart dispensed with assembly altogether in his opinion for the Court
in Shelton v. Tucker.129 Citing De Jonge and Bates—both of which had emphasized the
importance of assembly—Stewart posited that the right of free association was “a right
closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society.”130
Although it was clear that the Court’s focus on association was quickly
subsuming the freedom of assembly, the latter did not entirely disappear from the case
law. During the 1960s, the Court relied on principles of speech and assembly in several
cases to overturn convictions of African-Americans who had participated in peaceful
civil rights demonstrations.131 But in 1966, the Court rejected these arguments in the
context of a civil rights protest at a county jail in Adderly v. Florida.132 This drew a sharp
though somewhat rambling dissent from Justice Douglas, who warned that:
128Ibid., 522-23 (citation omitted).
129Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
130Ibid., 486.
131See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); and Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
132Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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Today a trespass law is used to penalize people for exercising a
constitutional right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breach-of-
the-peace statute, a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end. It is said
that the sheriff did not make the arrests because of the views which
petitioners espoused. That excuse is usually given, as we know from the
many cases involving arrests of minority groups for breaches of the peace,
unlawful assemblies, and parading without a permit. The charge against
William Penn, who preached a nonconformist doctrine in a street in
London, was that he caused “a great concourse and tumult of people” in
contempt of the King and “to the great disturbance of his peace.” That
was in 1670. In modern times, also, such arrests are usually sought to be
justified by some legitimate function of government. Yet by allowing
these orderly and civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed, we
only increase the forces of frustration which the conditions of second-class
citizenship are generating amongst us.133
But even though the justices disagreed over the limits that could be placed on the civil
rights demonstrations pervasive in the 1960s, it was clear that these cases involved
considerations of the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition “in their most pristine
and classic form.”134 Any earlier intimations of a broadly construed right of assembly
beyond these narrow circumstances were largely forgotten after NAACP v. Alabama.
The End of Assembly?
In 1983, the “classic form” of assembly was itself swept within the ambit of free
speech jurisprudence135 when the Court established the public forum doctrine in Perry
133Ibid., 56 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
134Edwards v. South Carolina, 235.
135The right of petition suffered a similar fate. See Stephen H. Higginson, "A Short
History of the Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances," Yale Law
Journal 96 (1986): 142 (“the right of petition was collapsed into the right of free speech
and expression…”).
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Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association.136 Justice White reasoned
that:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted
to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity
are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and
parks which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. In these quintessential public forums, the government may not
prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-
based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels
of communication.137
The doctrinal language came straight out of the Court’s free speech cases,138 and its
application to public fora rendered the right of assembly practically irrelevant. Perry’s
effects can be seen in the Court’s 1988 opinion in Boos v. Berry.139 Boos involved a
challenge to a District of Columbia law that prohibited, among other things, congregating
“within 500 feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used or
occupied by any foreign government or its representative or representatives as an
136Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).
137Ibid., 45 (citations and quotations omitted).
138Perry cited Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980); United States Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-536 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
supra, at 115; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
139Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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embassy, legation, consulate, or for other official purposes.”140 On its face, the challenge
to the regulation appeared to involve the freedom of assembly. The petitioner challenged
the “deprivation of First Amendment speech and assembly rights” and argued that “[t]he
right to congregate is a component part of the ‘right of the people peaceably to assemble’
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”141 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court cited
Perry three times and resolved the case exclusively under free speech principles without
reference to the freedom of assembly. The Court, in fact, has not addressed a freedom of
assembly claim in the last twenty years.142
140Ibid., 315.
141Brief for Petitioner at *74, *64 (1987 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 417).
142Justice Scalia has invoked the freedom of assembly (among others) in his dissents from
the Court’s decisions upholding restrictions on the activities of antiabortion protesters.
See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 774, 79 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
III. Association After Alabama
While assembly was being relegated to the margins of constitutional significance,
association garnered increased scholarly attention. The years following NAACP v.
Alabama produced a stream of historical and doctrinal analyses that had never
accompanied the Court’s decisions on assembly. Book length treatments included Glenn
Abernathy’s The Right of Assembly and Association (1961), Charles Rice’s Freedom of
Association (1962), and David Fellman’s The Constitutional Right of Association (1963).
These works sought to narrate a history of association that had been absent from two
centuries of constitutional jurisprudence. In some cases, they attempted to displace the
historical relevance of assembly. Rice, for example, contended that “[t]he right to
associate for the advancement of ideas ha[d] been recognized implicitly in the past, and it
ha[d] underlain important decisions which have been formally ascribed to the application
of other freedoms.”143 Abernathy, on the other hand, attempted to detail association’s
indebtedness to assembly, arguing that NAACP v. Alabama had placed the right of
association within an “expanded meaning” of the right of assembly, 144 and that
association was “clearly a right cognate to the right of assembly.”145
143Rice, Freedom of Association, xvii-xviii.
144Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association, 4.
145Ibid., 173. Abernathy commented that: “Freedom to assemble need not be artificially
narrowed to encompass only the physical assemblage in a park or meeting hall. It can
justifiably be extended to include as well those persons who are joined together through
organizational affiliation.” Ibid. Unfortunately, rather than provide an integrated account
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The Influence of Liberalism
The surge of interest in association in the early 1960s did not mean that the Court
invented it out of whole cloth. Although association had not previously been referenced
in American constitutional law, its theoretical importance could be traced to Locke,
Rousseau, and Mill among others. 146 But among those canonical liberal theorists,
association was intertwined with ideas of assembly and religious freedom. Proponents of
association in the 1960s turned instead to a much later theoretical foundation: Alexis de
Tocqueville, the Frenchman writing a half-century after the ratification of the Bill of
Rights.
Tocqueville’s words on association now grace the pages of almost every modern
treatment of the constitutional protections for groups. As Mark Warren has written,
Tocqueville “filled out the modern concept of association by providing it with a
sociology.”147 But the Tocqueville who serves as the progenitor of the modern freedom
of association is one who emerges from a distinctively liberal reading of Democracy in
of assembly and association, Abernathy divided his book into two distinct sections. His
account of assembly ended somewhat abruptly and his discussion of association was
almost entirely devoid of references to the Court’s assembly cases. Ibid., 145-67; 173-
96; 235-39.
146See generally Rice, Freedom of Association, 6-16.
147Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001), 42.
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America.148 It is critical, therefore, to recognize the lens through which Tocqueville’s
theory of association was viewed.
The decade preceding the emergence of the right of association was an era
characterized by interest group liberalism. It followed on the heels of the “new
liberalism” of the early twentieth century, which had assumed that “the instruments of
government provided the means for conscious inducement of social change.” 149
According to Theodore Lowi, early twentieth century liberalism had seen a “dialogue
between a private and a public view of society” that pitted a laissez-faire capitalist
ideology (eighteenth-century liberalism recast as “conservatism”) against an emerging
progressivism that appealed to government intervention.150 The New Deal decisively and
irrevocably endorsed the latter. Once “an indeterminable but expanding political sphere
was established,” 151 the debate shifted from the appropriateness of government
148Rogers M. Smith, "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in
America," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993).
149Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,
2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1979), 42.
150Ibid. The distinction between public and private can be seen in Locke and other
classical liberals, but it was “[t]he emergence of the market as a central legitimating
institution” that “brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal discourse
during the nineteenth century.” Morton J. Horwitz, "The History of the Public/Private
Distinction," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130 (1981): 1424. Horowitz
elaborates that “[o]ne of the central goals of nineteenth century legal thought was to
create a clear separation between constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law—public
law—and the law of private transactions—torts, contracts, property, and commercial
law.” Ibid. That separation came under attack when early twentieth-century legal
thinkers began to question the assumption that “private law could be neutral and
apolitical,” Ibid., 1426.
151Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 43.
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intervention to arguing over the limits of that intervention. The Supreme Court’s
resistance to Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation in the mid-1930s was spirited but short-
lived, and a decade later the Court had fully embraced the new liberalism. Its 1948
decision of Shelley v. Kraemer,152 which placed private contracts and covenants within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, signaled that the Court’s constitutional
jurisdiction had made significant inroads into the domain of “private” economic
activity.153
The “new American public philosophy” that emerged from this context was
interest group liberalism.154 It highlighted the importance of organized private groups to
counter growing concerns over an expanding federal government.155 But because interest
group liberalism assumed the new status quo of an enlarged “public sphere,” its
endorsement of group sovereignty was really epiphenomenal to a further legitimization of
expanding state power. The primary focus of early interest group liberalism was
152Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
153The Court concluded that state enforcement of property and contract laws qualified as
“state action” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby requiring states to
outlaw any “private” act of racial discrimination that relied on these market laws for its
enforceability. Ibid., 22-23.
154
———, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 50-51.
Lowi explained: “It is liberalism because it is optimistic about government, expects to use
government in a positive and expansive role, is motivated by the highest sentiments, and
possesses a strong faith that what is good for government is good for the society. It is
interest-group liberalism because it sees as both necessary and good a policy agenda that
is accessible to all organized interests and makes no independent judgment of their
claims. It is interest-group liberalism because it defines the public interest as a result of
the amalgamation of various claims.” Ibid., 51.
155Ibid., 55.
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decentralizing federal programs, not supporting grassroots nongovernmental associations,
and the theoretical framework presupposed a certain alignment of associations with state
interests. In Lowi’s words, “pluralist theory became the handmaiden of interest-group
liberalism, and interest-group liberalism became the handmaiden of modern American
positive national statehood.”156
The degree to which interest group liberalism presupposed a certain harmony with
the state was reflected in David Truman’s description of a “balance wheel” resulting from
Americans holding multiple memberships in unorganized groups “based on widely held
and accepted interests.” 157 Truman contended that “these unorganized interests are
dominant with sufficient frequency in the behavior of enough important segments of the
society so that, despite ambiguity and other restrictions, both the activity and the methods
of organized interest groups are kept within broad limits.” 158 In other words, a
sufficiently homogenous background consensus shared by all citizens not only sustained
the public order (which, for Truman, included “reinforcing widely accepted norms of
‘public morality’”159), but also bounded the extent to which interests groups diverged
from that shared consensus.160
156Ibid. In this sense, it “help[ed] create the sense that power need not be power at all,
control need not be control, and government need not be coercive.” Ibid.
157David Bicknell Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public
Opinion (New York: A. Knopf, 1951), 514.
158Ibid., 515.
159Ibid., 514.
160This is not to suggest that interest groups posed no danger to the state. Importantly, the
individualistic emphasis of interest group liberalism eschewed any notion of a “common
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The perceived homogenization also reflected another dimension of the new
liberalism that ushered in the New Deal. The progressive reforms of the early twentieth
century were largely based on “a belief in the capacity of American abundance to smooth
over questions of class and power by creating a nation of consumers.”161 Alan Brinkley
has asserted that liberal reformers were confident “that their new consumer-oriented
approach to political economy had freed them at last from the need to reform capitalist
institutions and from the pressure to redistributed wealth and economic power.”162 By
the 1950s, the liberal endorsement of a welfare and labor system predicated on a
fundamental belief in the capitalist state was pervasive enough for Daniel Bell to declare
the “end of ideology.”163
The social consensus that Truman and Bell observed in the 1950s was buttressed
by historians like Louis Hartz, whose 1955 book The Liberal Tradition in America164
good.” Robert Dahl warned that “[i]f unrestrained by external checks, any given
individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over others.” Robert Alan Dahl, A
Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 6. But for
Truman, the shared background consensus held by most Americans was sufficient to
restrain individual interest.
161Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New
York: Knopf, 1995), 226.
162Ibid., 271.
163Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). Bell argued that the changing face of the American
labor movement no longer evoked calls to Marxism or other ideologies.
164 Hartz’s book began with an epigram from Democracy in America and praised
Tocqueville for “a series of deep insights into the American liberal community.” Louis
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argued that the “moral unanimity” of Americans stemmed from a “nationalist articulation
of Locke” that had been the only significant intellectual influence upon the American
Founders.165 The “liberal consensus” among historians proved relatively short-lived. It
first came under fire with Bernard Bailyn’s Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution166 in 1967 and Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American Republic167 two
years later.168 Bailyn and Wood emphasized the classical and republican influences upon
colonial and early American thought. 169 Wood’s mention of the English term
“convention,” in particular, offered an historical link to early notions of assembly that
emphasized “an act of coming together” for “deliberation on important matters, whether
Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, 1955), i and 31.
165Ibid., 11.
166Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1967).
167Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787.
168Other important works included Robert E. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis:
The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography," The
William and Mary Quarterly 29 (1972). and J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975).
169The republican challenge eventually proved to be more of a corrective than a reversal,
and it is now generally acknowledged that neither liberal nor republican thought
dominated the founding era. See, e.g., Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time,
the Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 7 (“The truth lies somewhere in between. That is, in
the late eighteenth century, American political thought was in transition, moving from
classical republicanism to modern liberalism. Yet the transition was inconclusive, neither
clear nor complete, and the result was a hybrid mixture that combined republican and
liberal themes in a creative but uneasy collaboration.”). Cf. Barry Alan Shain, The Myth
of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4-18 (describing a similar hybrid).
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ecclesiastical, political or social.”170 But these republican sources, which might have
provided a firmer conceptual and historical framework to navigate the relationship
between associations and the state, were absent during the 1950s and early 1960s.
Hartz’s pronouncement of an “American Way of Life” reflected the social
consensus assumed by Truman and Bell. But Hartz argued that the “submerged and
absolute liberal faith” 171 of his fellow citizens differed from the Lockean liberalism
whose “most distinctive feature” was “its insistence that government should be limited so
as to free individuals to undertake private as well as public pursuits of happiness, even if
this option erodes public spiritedness in practice.”172 New Deal liberalism had unmasked
a “compulsive power” of liberalism that was now “so great that it has posed a threat to
liberty itself.”173
Hartz suggested that “[t]he decisive domestic issue of our time may well lie in the
counter resources a liberal society can muster against this deep and unwritten tyrannical
170Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 310.
171Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought since the Revolution, 10.
172Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1985), 14. The separation of the public and the private by
Locke and other classical liberals is by no means an unqualified good for the freedoms of
association and assembly. To the extent that the private realm has been construed as “not
political,” the divide between public and private tacitly endorses a greater “political”
legitimacy of the “public” (which is today synonymous with “the state”).
173Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political
Thought since the Revolution, 11.
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compulsion it contains.”174 But the “counter resources” invoked by 1950s interest group
liberals were not rooted in a strong distinction between public and private. Rather, they
emerged from a redefined liberalism that accepted the primacy of the state and the
subordination of all interests to it. The only viable theory of associations was one that
honored the state above all else and ensured that any dissenting interests would be
contained within manageable boundaries.
Interest group liberalism thus transformed Madison’s faction—which might be
“adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community”175—into a domesticated group whose interests were consistent with those of
the modern liberal state.176 Classical liberal theorists couldn’t be invoked to support this
new theory of associations because they, like Madison, had viewed associations with
trepidation, assuming that at least some of them would prove antithetical to the interests
of government and civil peace.177 But Tocqueville was a different story. He knew that
an “unrestrained liberty of political association” was fraught with danger, but he
174Ibid., 12.
175James Madison, "Federalist #10," in The Federalist, ed. Benjamin F. Wright (New
York: Barnes and Noble, 2004).
176Cf. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 55
(making this distinction).
177Rousseau asserted that: “[A]ny assembly of the people that has not been convened by
the magistrates appointed for that task and in accordance with the prescribed forms
should be regarded as illegitimate, and all that takes place there should be regarded as
null, since the order to assemble ought to emanate from the law.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 196.
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contended that it had “not hitherto produced, in the United States, those fatal
consequences which might perhaps be expected from it elsewhere.”178
Tocqueville’s optimism stemmed from his idealized view of associations in
America:
In America the citizens who form the minority associate, in order, in the
first place, to show their numerical strength, and so to diminish the moral
authority of the majority; and, in the second place, to stimulate
competition, and to discover those arguments which are most fitted to act
upon the majority; for they always entertain hopes of drawing over their
opponents to their own side, and of afterward disposing of the supreme
power in their name. Political associations in the United States are
therefore peaceable in their intentions, and strictly legal in the means
which they employ; and they assert with perfect truth that they only aim at
success by lawful expedients.179
In other words, Tocqueville presupposed that associations in America would never
seriously threaten the stability of government in America. He elaborated, tellingly, that
“[i]n a country like the United States, in which the differences of opinion are mere
differences of hue, the right of association may remain unrestrained without evil
consequences.”180 This sanguine characterization of associations was far removed from
the dissenting assemblies of William Penn, Angelina Grimké, and Anita Whitney.
178Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: D.
Appleton, 1899), 201. Cf. Ibid., 202-03 (“It can not be denied that the unrestrained
liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in
learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy, it perpetually
augments the chances of that calamity.”).
179 Ibid., 203-04. Tocqueville’s conception of association also retained glimpses of
assembly: association brought with it the “power of meeting” in which “men have the
opportunity of seeing each other.” Ibid., 198.
180Ibid., 204 (emphasis added).
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There were two glaring problems with the appropriation of Tocqueville’s account
of associations by mid-twentieth century liberals. The first was that Tocqueville’s case
study of America in the 1830s had focused on an extraordinarily homogenous population.
Rogers Smith has noted that Tocqueville and later accounts that drew upon him:
. . . falter because they center on relationships among a minority of
Americans—white men, largely of northern European ancestry—analyzed
in terms of categories derived from the hierarchy of political and
economic status such men held in Europe: monarchs and aristocrats,
financial and commercial burghers, farmers, industrial and rural laborers,
indigents. Because most European observers and most white American
men regarded these categories as political basic, it is understandable that
from America’s inception they thought that the most striking fact about
the new nation was the absence of one specific type of fixed, ascriptive
hierarchy. There was no hereditary monarchy or nobility native to British
America itself, and the Revolution rejected both the authority of the
British king and aristocracy and the creation of any new American
substitutes. Those genuinely momentous features of American political
life made the United States appear remarkably egalitarian in comparison to
Europe.181
But as Smith observes, the “relative egalitarianism that prevailed among white men” left
unaddressed immense inequities pertaining to gender, race, culture, religion, and sexual
orientation.182 When associations expanded to these interests—as they increasingly did
by the mid-twentieth century—differences of opinion were no longer merely differences
of hue, and the contours of Tocqueville’s ideal theory lost their descriptive purchase.
The second problem with the application of Tocqueville’s theory of association to
interest group liberalism was that Tocqueville had assumed a political order that was
bifurcated between a relatively limited government (which exercised law, authority, and
181Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conficting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 17.
182Ibid.
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coercion),183 and a larger sphere that consisted of nongovernmental social and economic
relations. Because Tocqueville viewed the associations that comprised the
nongovernmental sphere as more determinative in shaping the lives and values of citizens
than the more narrowly defined “government,” he saw associations as necessary to
maintaining democratic order through civic virtue:
Tocqueville linked capacities for mediation and representation to civic
habits developed within the associational fabric of civil society, which he
in turn related to a strong meaning of democracy located in associational
capacities for collective action. Reversing the Madisonian and
Rousseauian suspicions that associations are the social basis of political
factions and “conspiracies against the public interest,” Tocqueville argued
that secondary associations draw individuals out of their primary
associations, educating them about their dependence upon others. In this
way, associations provoke a civic consciousness and displace narrow self-
interest with a “self-interest rightly understood.” In addition, associations
cultivate reciprocity and trust among individuals, enabling them to
accomplish tasks together they could not manage alone. Thus, for
Tocqueville, the qualities of representative democracy depend on the
qualities of the society within which it is embedded, especially upon the
cultivation of civic virtues via associational ties. Democracy is centered,
as it were, in the self-rule manifested in associational life and in the civic
culture resulting from associational experiences.184
The difficulty in applying this framework to mid-twentieth century liberal thought was
that what was now considered within the reach of “government” or “public” was far
greater than Tocqueville had ever conceived.
183Tocqueville recognized that government extended its reach to the local: “[W]ithin the
pale of the great association of the nation, lesser associations have been established by
law in every country, every city, and, indeed, in every village, for the purposes of local
administration.” Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 600. But he viewed government
as limited in the scope of its jurisdiction: “[i]n the American republics the activity of the
central Government never as yet has been extended beyond a limited number of objects
sufficiently prominent to call forth its attention” Ibid., 290.
184Warren, Democracy and Association, 30.
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Tocqueville’s twin assumptions of a relatively homogenous and benign realm of
associations and a limited government that stayed out of that realm produced an
inevitable tension when interest group liberalism appropriated his theory. On the one
hand, by the middle of the twentieth century, some of those within the heterogeneous
population that Tocqueville had overlooked were forming associations that increasingly
demanded a voice in the democratic conversation. On the other hand, the expanded
notion of the “public” realm meant that the state was now regulating social and economic
relationships that had previously been beyond its reach. By the late 1950s and 1960s, the
subset of the state embodied by the Warren Court confronted these tensions less than
systematically. As Laura Kalman has argued, opinions of the Warren Court “emphasized
the importance of individual dignity, the significant role of the modern state in creating
and maintaining the good society, and the importance of shaping the relationship between
the modern welfare state and the individual so that the state’s powers are not imprudently
diminished, and individual dignity is preserved.”185 The resulting patchwork doctrine—
drawing from a Tocquevillian conception that didn’t fit political realities—failed to
articulate a coherent principle of group autonomy. It reflected, rather, the “jurisprudence
of substantive values”186 that characterized the opinions of the Court’s chief proponent of
the early freedom of assocation: William O. Douglas.
185Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996), 43 (citation omitted).
186Kenneth L. Karst, "William O. Douglas, 1898-1980," UCLA Law Review 27 (1980).
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William Douglas and the Freedom of Association
Dissenting in a case handed down the same day as NAACP v. Alabama, Douglas
wrote that the liberties contained in the First Amendment include “the right to believe
what one chooses, the right to differ from his neighbor, the right to pick and choose the
political philosophy that he likes best, the right to associate with whomever he chooses,
the right to join the groups he prefers, the privilege of selecting his own path to
salvation.”187 He initially located the freedom of association in the assembly clause,
writing in a 1960 concurrence that “freedom of assembly, includes of course freedom of
association.”188 But the following year, writing for the Court in Louisiana v. NAACP,189
Douglas located association in a more nebulous “bundle of First Amendment rights.”190
Two years later, Douglas signaled an explicit break from assembly in his
concurrence in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee.191 He began with
the text of the assembly clause:
“Peaceably to assemble” as used in the First Amendment necessarily
involves a coming together, whether regularly or spasmodically.
Historically the right to assemble was secondary to the right to petition,
the latter being the primary right. But today, as the Court stated in [De
187 Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399, 412-13 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
188Bates v. Little Rock, 528 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
189Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
190Ibid., 296.
191Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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Jonge], “The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free
speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”192
But building upon the rationale of NAACP v. Alabama, Douglas hinted that a more
expansive approach lay beyond the purview of assembly:
Joining a group is often as vital to freedom of expression as utterance
itself. Registering as a student in a school or joining a faculty is as vital to
freedom of expression as joining a church is to the free exercise of
religion. Joining a political party may be as critical to expression of one’s
views as hiring reporters is to the establishment of a free press. Some
have thought that political and academic affiliations have a preferred
position under the due process version of the First Amendment. But the
associational rights protected by the First Amendment are in my view
much broader and cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as well
as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion.193
Douglas expanded upon his arguments for association in a lecture that he delivered at
Brown University and subsequently published in the Columbia Law Review.194 Early in
his lecture, Douglas asserted that “the right of association is part of the right of
expression or of the right of belief.”195 As in his Gibson concurrence, he acknowledged
an ambiguous link to assembly.196 But Douglas moved swiftly from assembly to privacy:
Assembly, like speech, is indeed essential in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that the government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired,
192Ibid., 562. Douglas noted that “A Free Society is made up of almost innumerable
institutions through which views and opinions are expressed, opinion is mobilized, and
social, economic, religious, educational, and political programs are formulated.” Ibid.,
563.
193Ibid., 565.
194William O. Douglas, "The Right of Association," Columbia Law Review 63 (1963).
Douglas’s lecture advanced similar and at times verbatim arguments as his Gibson
concurrence.
195Ibid.: 1363.
196Ibid.: 1374.
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may be obtained by peaceful means. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Unpopular groups like
popular ones are protected. Unpopular groups, if forced to undergo
extensive investigation or disclose their membership lists, will not only
lose many adherents but may also suffer reprisals or other forms of public
hostility. But whether a group is popular or unpopular, the right of
privacy implicit in the First Amendment creates an area into which the
Government may not enter.197
Douglas’s lecture thus attributed the constitutional source of association to no less than
four rights that he identified in the First Amendment: assembly, privacy, expression, and
belief. Of these, only assembly was actually in the text of the amendment. It is no
wonder that Thomas Emerson would write a year later that “the constitutional source of
‘the right of association,’ the principles which underlie it, the extent of its reach, and the
standards by which it is to be applied have never been clearly set forth.”198 But the
obfuscated constitutional roots of association would prove crucial to Douglas’s opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut199
Griswold addressed a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives
and the giving of medical advice about their use, and specifically, the application of this
law to the use of contraceptives by married persons. Douglas’s draft opinion relied
exclusively on the right of association, describing the husband-wife relationship as at the
197Ibid.
198Emerson, "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression," 2.
199Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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core of protected forms of association.200 He made clear that the constitutional argument
did not hinge upon substantive due process:
Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that
implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Overtones of some arguments suggest that [Lochner v. New York] should
be our guide. But we decline that invitation as we did in [previous cases].
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions.201
Rather, Douglas contended, the case would be resolved exclusively within the scope of
the First Amendment. Although marriage did “not fit precisely any of the categories of
First Amendment rights,” it was “a form of association as vital in the life of a man or
woman as any other, and perhaps more so.”202
The day after he reviewed Douglas’s draft, Justice Brennan sent him a letter
urging him to abandon his First Amendment associational argument.203 He suggested
that Douglas instead analogize the Court’s recognition of association to a similar
broadening of the notion of privacy. But this analytic approach required that Douglas
200 Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985), 229.
201Ibid., 233 (quoting Douglas's draft opinion).
202 Ibid., 235 (quoting Douglas's draft opinion). Despite his reliance on the First
Amendment throughout his argument, Douglas concluded his draft with broader
references to privacy and the Constitution: “The prospects of police with warrants
searching the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives is repulsive to the idea of privacy and of association that make up a goodly
part of the penumbra of the Constitution and Bill of Rights.” Schwartz, The Unpublished
Opinions of the Warren Court, 236 (quoting Douglas's draft opinion).
203Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court, 237. Brennan argued that
Douglas’s expanded view of association would extend First Amendment protection to the
Communist Party. Ibid., 237-38.
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make a clear distinction between those freedoms explicitly protected by the Constitution
(like assembly) and those that were recognized only in later judicially constructed rights
(like association). Just a month prior to Griswold, Douglas had alluded to a singular
“right of assembly and association.”204 But in Douglas’s revised Griswold draft, the right
of association became “more than the right of assembly.”205 He argued that:
The right of “association,” like the right of belief . . ., is more than the
right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other
lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of
opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its
existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful.206
Douglas’s rhetoric thus advanced an extraordinarily thin conception of assembly that
encompassed only “the right to attend a meeting.” But this kind of reasoning belies the
fact that the freedom of assembly, like the freedom of speech, necessarily extends to acts
and associations that precede its actual manifestation. The government’s interference in
group membership or affiliation is to assembly what prior restraint is to speech. In each
case, the a priori state action restricts the speaker’s message prior to its enactment or
delivery: “To regulate the membership of an organization is often to alter its speech and
hence to regulate its speakers.”207 The Court had recognized this connection as early as
Thomas v. Collins:
204Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas J., dissenting) (quoting the Papal
encyclical Pacem in Terris).
205Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
206Ibid., 483.
207 George Kateb, "The Value of Association," in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy
Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 54.
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If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be
made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of
requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and
making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their
exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order.
So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech
and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction.208
Douglas, in fact, had quoted the above language in a 1961 dissent,209 adding that “[t]he
vices of registration [of an organization] may be not unlike those of licensing.”210 Yet
despite his repeated arguments against this kind of prior restraint in the area of free
speech,211 he failed to articulate the logical connection to assembly. This opened the door
for a right of association located in the “penumbra of the First Amendment”212 that drew
its theoretical justification not from the importance of protecting group autonomy but
from a heightened emphasis on privacy.
208Thomas v. Collins, 540.
209Communist Party of the United States v. The Subversive Activities Control Board, 367
U.S. 1 (1961).
210Ibid., 170 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
211See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 423 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“There is no free speech in the sense of the Constitution when permission must be
obtained from an official before a speech can be made. That is a previous restraint
condemned by history and at war with the First Amendment.”); Kingsley International
Pictures Corp. v. New York, 360 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1959) (Douglas J., dissenting) (“I can
find in the First Amendment no room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial,
reading a news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a movie.”); New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720-25 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
212Griswold v. Connecticut 514-15.
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Seven years after Griswold, Douglas argued in dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Iris213 that:
[T]he First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights . . .
create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering
with private clubs or groups. The associational rights which our system
honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be
formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to
be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her
associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.214
But Douglas’s views on association were less persuasive than his better known advocacy
for unrestrained speech. With the latter he had a constitutional text behind him: Congress
shall make no law. Assembly would have given him a similar premise, but his decision
to pursue association at the expense of assembly left him without any constitutional
provision, absolutist or otherwise. And a Court resistant to Douglas’s free speech
extremism proved even more skeptical of his absolutist views about the non-textual
associational freedom.215
The limits of Douglas’s associational views were challenged most directly by the
issue of racial discrimination. Although his rhetoric in Moose Lodge had asserted that the
associational right permitted “all white clubs,” Douglas’s voting pattern suggested
otherwise. In 1968, when the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer216 held that the fair
213Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
214Ibid., 179-80.
215Douglas biographer Bruce Murphy has noted that “[w]hen the Warren Court liberals
turned to the freedom-of-association area, they did not side as easily with Douglas’s
views.” Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill: The Legend and Life of William O. Douglas
(New York: Random House, 2003), 380.
216Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968217 were applicable to the private sale
or rental of property and thereby precluded a White homeowner from refusing to sell to a
Black buyer solely on the basis of race, Douglas concurred in the result without
mentioning the freedom of association.218 The following year, the Court extended its
reasoning to prohibit the denial of membership to a nonprofit community park and
playground on the basis of race.219 Douglas authored the majority opinion, again without
reference to associational freedom. And in reasoning that seems hard to reconcile with
his Moose Lodge dissent, he contended that the nonprofit could not be considered a
private social club if its only selective element was race.220
In 1973, the Court directly addressed the conflict between association and
discrimination in Norwood v. Harrison,221 a case involving the propriety of state textbook
loans to students attending racially discriminatory private schools. Chief Justice Burger
reasoned that:
Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. And
even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation
in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment;
21742 U. S. C. § 1982.
218Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 444-49 (Douglas, J., concurring).
219 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See also Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
220Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 236.
221Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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Congress has made such discrimination unlawful in other significant
contexts.222
Douglas concurred in the result without comment.223
Despite his seemingly inconsistent application of associational principles in racial
discrimination cases, Douglas’s advocacy of association was not without effect, and the
Court’s growing fascination with non-textual freedoms ensured that the embryonic right
of association took root amidst the Court’s post-Griswold jurisprudence. In 1972, only
fourteen years after its initial recognition of the right of association in NAACP v.
Alabama, the Court announced in Healy v. James 224 that: “While the freedom of
association is not explicitly set out in the [First] Amendment, it has long been held to be
implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.”225
But the associational right was inherently constrained by its emergence within
mid-twentieth century liberal thought. And as Douglas’s opinions demonstrate, these
same liberal impulses could not extend the associational right to its logical reach, which
would include protecting the illiberal practices of racist groups. This tension between
autonomy and equality was not a new one: it is evident throughout the canon of liberal
political thought, from Locke to Rousseau to Mill. But theory is much different than
constitutional doctrine. And the right of association—extracted from the historical
222Ibid., 470.
223Ibid., 471 (Douglas, J., concurring).
224Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
225Ibid., 181 (emphasis added).
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context and constitutional debate that produced the right of assembly—too easily
resolved the conflict of values without considering the consequences to the autonomy of
groups out of step with and even anathema to the state and its public policy. These
consequences would soon become even more pronounced.
IV. The Modern Right of Association
In 1976, a year after Douglas’s departure, the Court examined Runyon v.
McCrary226 the legality of racial discrimination by private schools in light of legislation
enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. Rejecting the suggestion that the
legislation “[did] not reach private acts of racial discrimination,”227 Justice Stewart wrote
that:
From [the principle of the freedom of association] it may be assumed that
parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational
institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and
that the children have an equal right to attend such institutions. But it does
not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such
institutions is also protected by the same principle.228
Despite its moral appeal, Stewart’s reasoning further undercut the freedom of association
by curtailing the right to exclude. In Norwood, the Court had concluded that a state could
not loan textbooks to students attending racially discriminatory private schools. That, in
effect, prevented government subsidization of an odious social practice. Runyon now
precluded the practice itself.
The distinction between advocacy (promoting the belief that racial segregation is
desirable) and practice (excluding racial minorities from private schools) may have
226Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
227Ibid., 173.
228Ibid., 176 (emphasis added).
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produced a socially desirable result, but it confined the freedom of association to an
instrumental role in support of free speech.229 This kind of reasoning differed markedly
from Douglas’s assertion in Griswold that the right of association “includes the right to
express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it
or by other lawful means.”230 For Douglas, the act of association had itself been an
intrinsically valuable form of expression; Stewart limited constitutional protection to
association for the purpose of expression.
A Shifting Justification for Association
The tenuous grounding of association in the penumbra of the First Amendment
took another curious turn in 1980. In an influential article published in the Yale Law
Journal,231 law professor Kenneth Karst returned to Douglas’s associational argument in
Griswold. 232 Karst noted that Douglas had emphasized the specific kind of association at
229Stewart reiterated this narrow understanding of association in different contexts in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (“Our decisions establish
with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”)
(emphasis added), and Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107,
121 (1981) (“First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of
advancing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement
by any State.”) (emphasis added).
230Griswold v. Connecticut, 483. Cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Joining is one method of expression.”).
231See Kenneth L. Karst, "The Freedom of Intimate Association," Yale Law Journal 89
(1979).
232Karst appears to have been writing very much from within the liberal tradition that
formed the backdrop to the early development of association. Rogers Smith places him
in a class of scholars who “still structure their accounts” on the premise that [i]lliberal,
undemocratic beliefs and practices” are “seen only as expressions of ignorance and
prejudice, destined to marginality by their lack of rational defenses.” Smith, "Beyond
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issue in that case: marriage. Douglas had concluded Griswold in characteristically
dramatic fashion:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.233
Since Griswold, the Court had expanded its “notions of privacy” in a line of cases
including Eisenstadt v. Baird234 and Roe v. Wade.235 But less attention had been given to
Douglas’s associational argument, which had been relegated to the periphery of the
opinion following Brennan’s suggestion to focus on privacy. Karst contended that
Griswold had nonetheless established a freedom of “intimate association,” which he
suggested was “a close and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some
Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America," 549. Referring to
Karst’s identification of “self-contradictory” elements in the American Creed that have
tolerated practices that are antithetical to liberal values, Smith writes that “Karst does not
explain why, given the contradictory elements of our ideology, only conformity with the
egalitarian ones counts as consistency and only compliance with the creed’s non-liberal
values constitutes hypocrisy.” Ibid.: 557 (discussing Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to
America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989)).
233Griswold v. Connecticut, 485-86. Douglas’s encomium to marriage was not without
irony given his well-known “checkered marital history and extramarital dalliances.”
Murphy, Wild Bill: The Legend and Life of William O. Douglas, 384.
234Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
235Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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significant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship.” 236 The implicit
corollary to Karst’s argument was that “non-intimate associations” must look elsewhere
for constitutional protection.
The problem with Karst’s reasoning was that it rested on a sociological ideal
rather than a legal reality. This was most evident in his assumption that all intimate
associations were, in fact, intimate. At one point, he wrote that “[c]aring for an intimate
requires taking the trouble to know him and deal with him as a whole person, not just as
the occupant of a role.”237 For Karst, “[t]his fact alone limits the number of intimate
associations any one person can have at any one time, or even in a lifetime.”238 But a
legal understanding of intimate association makes distinctions based upon the form of a
relationship, not its depth. Karst, in fact, acknowledged near the end of his article that
“any constitutional protection of enduring sexual relationships can be effective only if it
is extended to the choice to engage in casual ones.”239 But that concession called into
question the special status that he assumed for intimate associations in the first place.
Karst’s other arguments for the unique value of intimate association were
similarly dubious. He suggested, for example, that “[o]ne reason for extending
constitutional protection to casual intimate associations is that they may ripen into
236Karst, "The Freedom of Intimate Association," 629.
237Ibid.: 634.
238Ibid.: 634-35.
239Ibid.: 688-89.
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durable intimate associations.” 240 But the same potential exists with non-intimate
associations, and there is no plausible way to demarcate which among the diverse
intimate and non-intimate associations are more likely to “ripen into durable intimate
associations.” Some business relationships blossom into close friendships that last a
lifetime; some marriages fail in a matter of months.
Karst also contended that “An intimate association may influence a person’s self-
definition not only by what it says to him but also by what it says (or what he thinks it
says) to others.”241 But here again, Karst’s observation is equally applicable to non-
intimate associations. An individual’s decision to join the ACLU or to make a financial
contribution to Greenpeace can speak volumes about his or her self-definition. Indeed,
Karst acknowledged that “association-as-statement” in the form of political association in
the 1960s “served not only to promote specific policy goals but also as an outlet for
expressiveness, for self-identifying assertions.”242
Roberts v. Jaycees
In fairness to Karst, the objective of his article was to build a case for intimate
associations, not to diminish the protections for non-intimate ones.243 But four years
240Ibid.: 633.
241Ibid.: 636.
242Ibid.
243One of Karst’s primary aims appears to have been the decriminalization of homosexual
conduct. Justice Blackmun cited Karst’s article twice in his dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67
later, Justice Brennan’s appropriation of Karst’s arguments led to the latter. 244
Concluding that a Minnesota law required the Jaycees to accept women members to their
organization, Brennan announced in Roberts v. United States Jaycees that there were, in
fact, “two distinct senses” of the freedom of association. 245 The right of intimate
association received protection “as a fundamental element of personal liberty.”246 The
right of expressive association, on the other hand, was “a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”247
Following Karst, Brennan recognized an intrinsic value to intimate association.
He also declared that expressive association was merely instrumental to the advancement
of other First Amendment freedoms. 248 Brennan defined an intimate association as
“distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical
244 Although Brennan’s opinion never cited Karst’s article, the intellectual debt is
apparent.
245Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 617.
246Ibid., 618.
247Ibid.
248Ibid. Cf. Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep, 41 (contending that Brennan
regarded expressive association “as instrumental and therefore subject to greater
government intrusion”); Kateb, "The Value of Association," 46 (“Running through
Brennan’s opinion is the assumption that all nonintimate relationships are simply inferior
to intimate ones.”).
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aspects of the relationship.”249 Unsurprisingly, Brennan concluded that “several features
of the Jaycees clearly place the organization outside of the category of relationships
worthy of this kind of constitutional protection.”250 Brennan nonetheless appeared to
recognize the significance of the consequences of the Minnesota law to the Jaycees:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure
or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of
the original members to express only those views that brought them
together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate.251
But Brennan made short shrift of these concerns in light of the state’s compelling interest
in eliminating discrimination.252 Even more audaciously, he then claimed that the forced
integration of women would have no effect on the expressive interests of the Jaycees.253
There was, according to Brennan, “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of
women as full voting members [would] impede the organization’s ability to engage in . . .
protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”254
249Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 620. Brennan continued that: “As a general matter,
only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that
have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal
liberty.” Ibid.
250Ibid.
251Ibid., 623.
252Ibid.
253Brennan wrote that “[T]he Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any
serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive association.” Ibid., 626.
254Ibid., 627.
69
Brennan’s associational typology also led him to conclude that intimate
associations, unlike expressive associations, allowed individuals to draw “emotional
enrichment from close ties with others” and provided “the ability independently to define
one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”255 It is unclear why this claim
isn’t equally applicable to non-intimate associations. As Nancy Rosenblum has
observed: “the onus for cultivating the moral dispositions of liberal democratic citizens
falls heavily on voluntary groups such as the Jaycees and their myriad counterparts.”256
But even leaving aside the identity-shaping potential of large associations, a distinction
based on size is misleading because most people interact with large associations through
local assemblies. The Jaycees may have been a 295,000 member organization in 1981,257
but most of its individual members did not adopt its values and purposes by reading an
organizational charter. More likely, they were influenced through personal interaction
with other members. Brennan’s observation that “the local chapters of the Jaycees are
large and basically unselective groups,”258 also misses the point. Even if the Minneapolis
chapter had “approximately 430 members,”259 it is probable that individual friendships
formed within smaller circles. At least one of the early Democratic-Republican societies,
255Ibid., 619.
256Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the
Dynamic of Exclusion," in Freedom of Association, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998), 76.
257Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 613 (“At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees
had approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state
organizations.”).
258Ibid., 621 (emphasis added).
259Ibid.
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it will be recalled, had upwards of 300 members.260 Like these popular societies, the
Jaycees at a local level likely exhibited some of Brennan’s “intimate” characteristics.
Commentators have roundly criticized Brennan’s reasoning. Rosenblum has
observed that: “The Jaycees’ ‘voice’ was undeniably altered once it was forced to admit
young women as full members along with young men.”261 Aviam Soifer contested that:
“Surely the Jaycees . . . will be a different organization. Surely that difference will be felt
throughout an intricate web of relationships and different voices in immeasurable but
nonetheless significant ways.”262 And George Kateb suggested that: “Brennan’s claim
that young women may, after their compulsory admission, contribute to the allowable
purpose of ‘promoting the interests of young men’ is absurd.”263 Indeed, it is hard to take
seriously Brennan’s claim that the compelled admission of women did not infringe upon
the Jaycees’ associational freedom. But even more significantly, his bifurcation of a
singular freedom of association into a hierarchical pair of associational freedoms
weakened the constitutional protections of groups. Any group that the Court now
classifies as an expressive non-intimate association—and this includes most of the
associations that have been and will be subjected to antidiscrimination regulation—is
automatically relegated to a lower constitutional status. The strict scrutiny that the Court
applies to regulation of expressive association will be less than the strict scrutiny that it
260See supra, note 63.
261Rosenblum, "Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic
of Exclusion," 78.
262Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep, 40.
263Kateb, "The Value of Association," 55.
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applies to regulation of intimate association; otherwise, there would be no purpose in
distinguishing between the two kinds of association.
After Roberts
Roberts opened a gaping hole in the already attenuated freedom of association,
and its framework produced predictable results in two subsequent cases involving private
organizations that refused membership to women. In 1987, the Court held in Board of
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte264 that the Rotary Club had no
First Amendment right to exclude women. The following year, in New York State Club
Ass’n v. City of New York,265 the Court upheld anti-discrimination laws applied to a
consortium of New York City social clubs. The Court narrowed the scope of expressive
association by announcing that a group must demonstrate that it was “organized for
specific expressive purposes” and that “it will not be able to advocate its desired
viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership” to certain classes of
people.266 The Court emphasized that the right to associate was by no means absolute: it
did not mean “that in every setting in which individuals exercise some discrimination in
choosing associates, their selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the
Constitution.”267
264Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987).
265New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
266Ibid., 13.
267Ibid.
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Contemporaneous with the Roberts line of cases in the 1980s, the Court issued
two important decisions pertaining to the associational boundaries of religious
organizations. In 1983, the Court in Bob Jones University v. United States268 upheld the
decision of the Internal Revenue Service to revoke the tax-exempt status of Christian
educational institutions that discriminated on the basis of race. Four years later, in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos,269 the Court leaned in the other direction in concluding that it was permissible for
the Mormon Church to deny a non-church member employment as a building engineer in
a gymnasium operated by the church and open to the public. Although neither Bob Jones
nor Amos directly addressed the freedom of association, both cases raised important
issues about the relationship between religious associations and the state and the interplay
of the freedom of association with the freedom of religion.
The association cases of the 1980s—both those like Roberts that expressly
addressed the right of association and those like Bob Jones that did not—suggested that
association still lacked a coherent doctrinal framework. In 1998, Amy Gutmann’s edited
volume Freedom of Association,270 explored some of the theoretical tensions raised in
these recent cases. Gutmann’s introductory essay attempted to locate the freedom of
association within the American constitutional tradition. She began with Tocqueville,
268Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
269Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 327 (1987).
270Amy Gutmann, ed., Freedom of Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1998).
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and most of her historical attention focused on the Court’s conception of association in
Roberts. Gutmann argued nevertheless that the freedom of association “should not be
contingent upon its furthering justice.”271 George Kateb offered an even stronger defense
of association and an extended critique of Roberts, concluding that the Jaycees “were
within their rights to associate on their own deplorable terms.”272 Kent Greenawalt’s
essay addressed the issues of religious association raised in Bob Jones and Amos, and
suggested a “reasonably defensible” justification for treating claims of religious
association more strongly than those from some other forms of association. Michael
Walzer, Nancy Rosenblum, Will Kymlicka, Daniel Bell, and other prominent thinkers
also contributed essays. None of the contributors, however, offered an historical
treatment of the development of association or its relationship to assembly. And the
volume ultimately raised more questions than answers. William Galston’s review in the
American Political Science Review summarized the tensions raised in the book:
[Gutmann’s collection] is clearly the best introduction to issues raised by
freedom of association in modern liberal democracies. It helps us
understand why Alexis de Tocqueville is so much the man of the hour, and
why fashionable neo-Tocquevillean enthusiasms must be tempered by
uncomfortable economic, political, and even psychological facts.
Voluntary groups are the source of much that is valuable, but they are not
a silver-bullet cure for the characteristic ills of modern liberal democracy,
and some of their practices are bound to trouble even dedicated defenders
of free association who also care about the equal dignity of every
citizen.273
271Ibid., 31.
272Kateb, "The Value of Association," 61.
273William A. Galston, "Freedom of Association," American Political Science Review 94,
no. 4 (2000): 929.
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The difficulty left unaddressed in Gutmann’s book and Galston’s synopsis was that the
‘neo-Tocquevillean enthusiasms” had led to a freedom of association that favored
substantive policy outcomes over procedural protections built around a theoretical
understanding of group autonomy.
Two years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale.274 Because the Court sided with the association of the Boy Scouts, Dale seemed
on the surface to represent a curtailment of the Roberts doctrine. But, as we shall see,
Dale largely adopted the Roberts framework, making its outcome appear no less policy-
driven than the one reached in Roberts.
Boy Scouts v. Dale
In Dale, the Court concluded in a 5-4 decision that the right of expressive
association permitted the Boy Scouts to exclude from their membership a homosexual
scoutmaster despite a New Jersey antidiscrimination law that prohibited such exclusions
in places of public accommodation.275 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court
began by placing the case within the framework of expressive association:
To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment’s
expressive associational right, we must determine whether the group
engages in “expressive association.” The First Amendment’s protection of
expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come
274Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The facts of Dale are covered
extensively in the literature. See, e.g., Mazzone, "Freedom's Associations," 666-74
Evelyn Brody, "Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of
Association," U.C. Davis Law Review 35 (2002): 848-54.
275The Supreme Court deferred to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s determination that the
Boy Scouts were a public accommodation within the meaning of the statute.
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within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether
it be public or private.276
Rehnquist distanced himself from some of the Court’s earlier views on expressive
association. Although New York State Club Ass’n appeared to have narrowed the right of
expressive association to groups that were organized “for specific expressive
purposes,”277 Rehnquist argued that:
[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the “purpose” of disseminating
a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity
that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.278
For Rehnquist, the proper inquiry was “whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public
or private viewpoints.” 279 And this inquiry required that the Court defer to an
organization’s purported views:
[I]t is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values
because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent. As is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms,
the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular
expression as unwise or irrational.280
276Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). The Boy Scouts did not
argue that they should be classified as an intimate association.
277New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 13.
278Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 655. Justice Stevens challenged Rehnquist’s reasoning:
“to prevail on a claim of expressive association in the face of a State’s antidiscrimination
law, it is not enough simply to engage in some kind of expressive activity.” Ibid., 682
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
279Ibid., 650.
280Ibid., 651 (citations and quotations omitted).
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These strong words echoed the sentiments of Brandeis and Douglas, but they hardly
seemed credible after Runyon and Roberts. Justice Stevens’s dissent highlighted the
doctrinal tension that Dale created:
[U]ntil today, we have never once found a claimed right to associate in the
selection of members to prevail in the face of a State’s antidiscrimination
law. To the contrary, we have squarely held that a State’s
antidiscrimination law does not violate a group’s right to associate simply
because the law conflicts with that group’s exclusionary membership
policy.281
While Dale has been hailed by some as a victory for associations, Rehnquist’s
reasoning exposed a highly malleable judicial construct:
[I]n the associational freedom cases such as Roberts, Duarte, and New
York State Club Assn., after finding a compelling state interest, the Court
went on to examine whether or not the application of the state law would
impose any “serious burden” on the organization’s rights of expressive
association. So in these cases, the associational interest in freedom of
expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on
the other.282
Far from signaling a robust associational freedom, Dale’s “serious burden” test revealed
an arbitrariness as problematic as the balancing found elsewhere in the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. 283 But Dale was less of a doctrinal revelation than a
confirmation of Thomas Emerson’s admonition in 1964 that:
281Ibid., 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282Ibid., 658-59.
283John Hart Ely has cautioned that the First Amendment’s “balancing tests inevitably
become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing—or
if not that, at least with the relative confidence or paranoia of the age in which they are
doing it—and we must build barriers as secure as words are able to make them.” John
Hart Ely, "Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis," Harvard Law Review 88 (1975): 1501.
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In its ultimate result, the use of the ad hoc balancing formula leaves “the
right of association” with little concrete protection in effect subject to
restriction by any “reasonable” regulation. It is true of course, that a
majority of the [Warren] Court does employ the ad hoc balancing test in
most first amendment cases, whether or not “the right of association” is
involved. But the point is that “the right of association” concept is so
broad, so undifferentiated, that its use effectively precludes any other
approach. And the balancing process here is even less confined, and less
subject to objective application, than where specific rights of freedom of
speech, press, assembly or petition are subjected to that treatment.284
After Brennan’s dichotomy between intimate and expressive association and Rehnquist’s
serious burden analysis, Emerson’s observation was more descriptive than ever.
284Emerson, "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression," 14.
V. Recovering the Freedom of Assembly
The preceding pages have traced the history of the constitutional protections
accorded to groups, beginning with a freedom of assembly vigorously defended in the
making of the Bill of Rights and culminating with what I have characterized as a weak
right of association. The declension narrative that I have offered is not easily explained.
If, as one commentator has suggested, “an association is merely an assembly dispersed
over time and space,”285 then it would seem that the constitutional protections of groups
would only have grown with an increased focus on the ostensibly broader right of
association. But the critical difference between assembly and association is that the
former is linked to a longstanding history that recognizes the political—and even more
precisely, the counter-political—character of maintaining a means of communicating
dissent toward the ruling political order and protecting the gathered people who embody
that dissent. Association, in contrast, has drawn upon at least three distinct justifications
during its development over the past fifty years: first a Tocquevillian liberalism that
emphasized the importance of autonomy, then the penumbras of the First Amendment
that linked association to privacy, and, most recently, a tenuous elevation of intimacy
over expressivism. The result has been a highly malleable doctrine that somewhat
arbitrarily extends constitutional protection to some groups and denies it to others.
285C. Edwin Baker, "Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech," UCLA Law
Review 25 (1978): 1032.
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One way to challenge this state of affairs is to return to the concept of assembly.
The right of assembly—at least as it was originally conceived in the early part of our
nation’s history—protects the members of a group based not upon their principles or
politics but simply by virtue of their coming together in an alternative way of life.286 By
itself, of course, this definition is as flimsy as that of association. Because the state
determines the kinds of practices that are “inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite
to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government
and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means,”287 the interests of the state always trump
the right of assembly.288 But an emphasis on the right of assembly and the kinds of
unpopular, renegade, and even dangerous gatherings that have sought refuge in that right
reminds us of the importance of resisting all but the rarest of encroachments upon an
assembled people. This caution is obscured in the shifting theoretical and jurisprudential
justifications of association, which have too easily permitted incursions into group
autonomy.
One practical way to counter the weakened right of association is to recover the
freedom of assembly as a viable independent constitutional claim in First Amendment
286This understanding of assembly may have particular implications in light of the rapidly
evolving changes in communication technology and the related sociological and
philosophical questions that those changes bring. The proliferation of online dating,
internet chat rooms, and virtual clubs and associations raises a number of important
issues about the character of groups.
287Whitney v. California, 371.
288Even Brandeis’s response to the Whitney majority acknowledged this reality. He wrote
that “[t]he fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression,” but he intimated that restraints will be
warranted when there is “the probability of serious injury to the State.” Ibid., 378.
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litigation. Rather than rely simply on the freedom of association or an ambiguous
conglomeration of other First Amendment freedoms, future litigants in appropriate cases
might argue in the alternative the right of peaceable assembly. Although it is possible
that courts would conclude that the freedom of assembly is an antiquated precursor to the
freedom of association,289 it would be unprecedented for a judicially constructed right
completely to subsume an explicitly constitutional right. Moreover, the Court’s previous
decisions maintain an ambiguous link between assembly and association that falls short
of equating the two concepts. On the other hand, if courts were expressly to recognize
the continued importance of the freedom of assembly, then they would need to craft a
doctrinal framework and outline the relationship of assembly to other First Amendment
freedoms.
A contemporary doctrinal approach to assembly might establish a tiered system in
which a claim to free assembly is strongest for an actual gathering of people and weakens
as a group’s claim moves away from a physical assembly to more attenuated identity
claims like intimacy. While this would be a plausible approach, it would be inconsistent
with the Court’s free speech doctrine, which recognizes that narrowly drawn time, place,
and manner restrictions form the exception rather than the rule. It is one thing to debate
and criticize a form of expression once it has been conveyed—whether through actual or
symbolic speech or by the mere existence of a group. It is quite another to preclude
expression altogether.
289Cf. Rishe, "Freedom of Assembly," 317 (“To refer to [association] as a new freedom
would be amiss for it is only a further development of the freedom of assembly so plainly
stated in the first amendment.”).
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An express recognition of assembly does not come without a price. It jeopardizes
the doctrinal soundness of cases like Norwood and Runyon, whose holdings are now
almost universally regarded as morally commendable. It weakens Roberts and
strengthens Dale, a consequence that many would view as unhealthy to a liberal society.
But the right of the people to express together in both word and action beliefs and views
that differ from those held by the majority may well be worth these costs. This is the
case even if those views threaten or are morally repugnant to a liberal democratic vision.
It is the risk that Brandeis confronted in Whitney when he faced a concrete social
movement that advocated the violent overthrow of the existing government. 290
Brandeis’s insistence that “[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly”291 points us toward a meaningful freedom of assembly that is
essential to democracy even as it renders it more volatile and more vulnerable.
290Anita Whitney’s real danger to the state did not stem from her individual adherence to
a charter or set of rules but because she and her associates comprised a group of people
ready to take physical action to advance their cause. Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2d ed. (New York: Norton,
1978), 500. (“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly
declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social
conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians
have nothing to lose but their chains.”).
291Whitney v. California, 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis elaborated that “The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
State.” Ibid., 378.
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